Due to economic, financial and administrative constraints, least-developed countries (LDCs) have not managed to make significant progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Traderelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In the latest TRIPS Council meeting of 11-12 June 2013, WTO Members have accepted this reality and granted LDCs a second extension of the transition period for another eight years. This working paper seeks to assist future discussions on how to meaningfully integrate the poorest countries into the WTO system for the protection of intellectual property. The authors first provide a comprehensive legal analysis of the various rights and obligations for LDCs, developed country Members and international organizations under the transitional arrangements in the TRIPS Agreement, subsequent WTO legislation and in particular the TRIPS Council Decisions of November 2005 and June 2013. The text also contains on overview on the underlying factors and processes that lead to these progressive extensions of the transition period for LDCs till July 2021. It then identifies substantial shortcomings of the current situation following the Decision of June 2013. Above all, there is still need for greater coordination on the national and multilateral level in order to provide incentives to LDCs to engage in this process and to unlock increased technical and financial assistance for LDCs. The authors then propose potential avenues for WTO Members to move forward: The priority needs assessment process should be reformed and additional incentives should be identified for WTO Members to cooperate more actively towards LDCs' integration in the global IP system. The authors also advocate the application of a more gradual and development-oriented concept of TRIPS implementation for LDCs.
presents a brief summary and the implications of our findings for the ongoing debate and makes recommendations on potential avenues to better integrate the LDCs into the global system for the protection of intellectual property. Section 6 concludes.
Rights and obligations of the WTO Members with regard to the LDCs' implementation of the TRIPS Agreement

1. LDCs' role in the TRIPS negotiations
At the time of the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, most industrialized countries had longestablished comprehensive domestic legislation in the field of IPRs. These same countries had also negotiated, signed and ratified several WIPO Conventions and Treaties. Thus, industrialized countries had a strong framework of IPRs in both the domestic and the international sphere. By contrast, many developing countries and most LDCs 3 had neither a comprehensive domestic system for the protection and enforcement of IPRs nor much experience in negotiating international conventions and treaties on IPRs. It is thus not surprising that a group of industrialized countries were not only the demandeurs but also largely dictated the shape of the negotiating text and of the final text.
More specifically, even when seeking to include IP as a negotiating topic in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the US and other industrialized countries used the carrot and stick approach to achieve the objective of strengthening the global system of IP protection. The carrots for negotiating and agreeing to the inclusion of IP in the Uruguay Round were concessions in other trade areas, notably increased access to developed country agriculture and textiles markets. 4 Developing countries were also granted several important TRIPS-related concessions, most notably deferred implementation of the substantial portions of the agreement and in promises of technology transfer and assistance. 5 The stick came in the form of a threat 3 The categorization of countries as developed or developing has been a matter of uncontested self-selection; however, this is not necessarily automatically accepted in in the WTO context. According to Article XI:2 of the WTO Agreement, the WTO recognizes those countries as least-developed which have been designated as such by the United Nations. The United Nations Economic and Social Council ('ECOSOC') reviews the list every three years according to the following three criteria: low per capita income, weak human resources, and high economic vulnerability. The TRIPS Agreement is unprecedented insofar as it was the first WTO covered agreement to venture 'beyond the border' and thus to have a considerable impact upon on the internal legal system of a Member. Examples of such impact can be seen through the minimum standards set out in the TRIPS Agreement, the requirement to establish certain authorities, border controls measures and domestic enforcement mechanisms, including judicial review and even criminal liability for certain IPR offences. Unsurprisingly, the implementation costs of the TRIPS Agreement for most developing countries have been considerable, in terms of both monetary and intellectual resources. This is true even of countries which had a fairly advanced IPR framework prior to the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, but even more so for developing countries that had not fully established a domestic IPR framework prior to the TRIPS Agreement. It is therefore no exaggeration to state that for most, if not all, LDC
Members of the WTO, effective implementation and operation of the TRIPS Agreement was not possible in the decade following its creation.
Recognizing this reality, the TRIPS Agreement allows for transitional arrangements for both developing countries and LDCs. The special and differential treatment towards LDCs begins in the Preamble itself, which not only recognizes that transitional arrangements are necessary when aiming 'at the fullest participation in the results of the negotiations' but also specifically highlights that due to the special developmental objectives and particular needs of LDCs 'maximum flexibility' should be accorded in the implementation of IP laws and regulation in order for them to create a sound and viable technological base. More specific provisions relating to transitional arrangements and LDCs are covered in Articles 65 and 66 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Transitional arrangements contained in Article 65 of the TRIPS Agreement
Part VI (Articles 65-67) of the TRIPS Agreement provides for the transitional arrangements.
Articles 65 and 66 define the length of time Members are given to bring their intellectual property laws and regulations into full conformity with the obligations of the Agreement. 'assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the prevention of their abuse, and support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel'.
The language used in Article 67 is vague, and the exact contours of the obligations it contains are unclear. Official WTO documents provide little guidance as to the exact meaning or interpretation of the terms in Article 67, and to date no dispute over the transitional arrangements in Part VI of the TRIPS Agreement has been brought before the WTO's dispute settlement body. 14 What is clear is that the provision does not impose any mandatory rules or particular methods of cooperation on developed country Members. That being said, the obligation on developed country Members to cooperate is triggered upon the receipt of a formal request from a developing country or LDC Member, followed by the conclusion of mutually agreed terms and conditions governing the cooperation activities.
Although Article 67 refers to technical and financial assistance, it seems clear that the assistance could include technical and financial assistance or only one of the two (although it also seems that the 'or' option is not the preferred course of action). The donor and beneficiary countries are free to determine the course of the negotiation process as well as the nature and scope of the cooperation. Developing country or LDC Members are at liberty to choose the developed country Member from which they request cooperation, but it remains unclear whether and how developed country Members could prioritize their efforts aimed at particular beneficiaries under this provision.
The vagueness and ambiguity of Article 67 has hampered its effectiveness. To put it mildly, Article 67 did not fulfil the expectations of many LDC Members during first ten years of the TRIPS Agreement and instead has led to some frustration in the development community.
5. The first extension of the LDC transition period for LDCs
In response to rising awareness of the issues surrounding access to essential medicines, 15 -thirdly, the Decision mandates the WTO Secretariat to increase its cooperation with WIPO and other relevant international organizations to assist LDCs in the above-mentioned needs assessment process and to make technical assistance and capacity building as effective and operational as possible;
-fourthly, the Decision introduced a 'no roll-back' provision that required LDCs to ensure that changes to their laws, regulations and practice made during the extended transitional period do not result in a lesser degree of consistency with the TRIPS Agreement.
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The inclusion of a 'no roll-back' provision for LDCs has been criticized by some LDCs and NGOs, which argue that it reduces the policy space available to LDCs during the transition period. 24 Interestingly, the TRIPS Council Decision did not make any reference to or establish any links to the technology transfer provision in Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement.
State of play before the second extension of the transition period for LDCs
1. Achievements and shortcomings of the priority needs assessment process
As mentioned internal institutions and stakeholders, which is a necessary precursor to developing and implementing a national innovation and IP policy. Likewise, a successfully completed priority needs assessment is a strong signalling device as it demonstrates a national commitment towards IP reform, which could be seen by some as being essential for LDCs to attract technical and financial assistance. Moreover, the priority needs assessments provide potential donors with an insight into the socio-economic context and the institutional dynamics of the TRIPS Agreement implementation in the potential beneficiary country, again allowing for more targeted and tailored technical and financial assistance.
Unfortunately, the TRIPS Council Decision of 2005 did not specify any formal requirements or a particular mechanism for the conduct and submission of priority needs assessments by LDCs. Therefore, the appropriate scope, depth, breadth and quality of the priority needs assessments remain unclear. Likewise, it is not further specified who should be funding and conducting these exercises. As a result, the priority needs assessments submitted thus far differ significantly in quality, scope, analytical reasoning and structure. In the case of Uganda and Sierra Leone, the priority needs assessment process was mainly funded by the United Kingdom Department for International Development ('DFID') and both governments received considerable support and assistance from the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development ('ICTSD') and a specialized consulting firm. On the other hand, Bangladesh conducted its priority needs assessment on its own without any donor assistance or support.
The submissions also differed substantively, and approached the issue of how to attract the attention of potential donors in a significantly different manner. For instance, Uganda complemented the needs assessment with a fully-developed national capacity building programme referred to as the Uganda Trade and Intellectual Property ('UTIP'), a programme that contained detailed descriptions of activities and a clear implementation timetable with a budget of a US$2 million. In contrast, Bangladesh submitted only a brief priority needs assessment paper of 20 pages that included a one-page rough budget requesting approximately US$ 71 million.
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Overall, the priority needs assessments submitted may be well-considered, carefully conducted exercises which thoughtfully analysed the perceived needs of the LDC concerned. From a development aid perspective though, many of the proposed implementation plans did not meet the standards and principles of aid effectiveness that have been developed over recent decades (e.g. in the Paris Declaration). 30 Moreover, the priority needs identified are often not compatible with the actual capacities or project management requirements of the targeted donors. Thus, it is unrealistic for the LDC concerned, or for interested NGOs, to expect that the requests stemming from the priority needs assessment will be immediately met. Instead, the formulation of requests via the priority needs assessment should be viewed as only the first step in what development cooperation experts call project-cycle management ('PCM'), not as something that will automatically trigger to the implementation of the requested projects.
There also appears to be confusion, or at the very least a certain disconnect, between LDCs and potential donors, on the purpose of the technical and financial assistance requests contained in the priority needs assessment. For instance, while some of the requests contained in the priority needs assessments go beyond achieving compliance with the TRIPS Agreement obligations and are designed to contribute to the establishment of a national IP system that is beneficial to the country's socio-economic development (e.g. Bangladesh's priority needs assessment requests US$ 14.5 million for community-based museums and for conducting research on traditional knowledge), 31 some potential donor countries believe that technical and financial assistance should be exclusively targeted at bringing LDCs' intellectual property laws and institutions into compliance with the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.
As a consequence of these asymmetries, it remains unclear what the follow-up procedure should be once an assessment has been submitted to the TRIPS Council. The eight LDCs that have so far participated in the exercise have received little response from developed country Members and insufficient funding to make substantial progress on the implementation of their 30 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness had been endorsed in 2005 by more than 100 signatories (from donor and recipient country governments, multilateral donor agencies, regional development banks and international agencies) in order to address the fact that development aid had become increasingly fragmented, less predictable, less transparent and more volatile. The Declaration represented a broad consensus among the international community on how to make development cooperation more effective by introducing new mechanisms such as conditionality, capacity building and support for governance. Furthermore, it focused on five principles: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. 
Efforts of the WTO Secretariat
The TRIPS Responding to another request by the LDC group, the WTO Secretariat organized three regional workshops on the priority needs for these countries in 2010. 37 Furthermore, key representatives from LDCs, developed countries and interested international organizations took part in a symposium on LDCs' needs assessment in Geneva in October 2011. This review session concluded that the existing technical assistance contact points between the partners should be used in a more systematic manner. More specifically, the participants in the review session recommended the establishment of small coordination groups in order to respond comprehensively to the priority needs assessments tabled. The participants also recommended increased coordination to support further priority needs assessments and to respond to the needs that have already been identified. Finally, the participants agreed on the need for practical tools and common resources which can provide methodological advice to LDCs on how to participate in the priority needs assessment process.
38
As a result of the review session, Switzerland requested that the WTO Secretariat contact the Secretariat of the Enhanced Integrated Framework ('EIF') and the coordinator of the Aid-for- In October/November 2012, the WTO Secretariat, supported by the Swedish Government, hosted a symposium with a variety of stakeholders to better coordinate the assistance to those
LDCs that have yet to submit their priority needs assessments. Among other things, the participants agreed that further considerations should be given to identifying centralized or country-specific coordination mechanisms as well as to the idea of establishing a dedicated fund to support the priority needs assessment process. 
4. The need for enhanced coordination on various levels in order to make the priority needs assessment process work
To date, developed country Members' response to the priority needs assessments submitted has been somewhat disappointing. Except for informal talks among industrialized countries and a few matchmaking workshops and meetings with LDCs, no comprehensive and coordinated follow-up has taken place and only very limited IPRTA has been provided. There are a variety of reasons for this lack of coordination.
Foremost is that IPRTA is a relatively new topic in the field of development cooperation and the track record of IPRTA in LDCs is very limited. There is still a lack of research and best practices when it comes to the implementation and the impact assessment of the TRIPS limited absorption capacity as their legal and institutional framework for IP protection is usually in an embryonic stage and they lack educational and professional capacity in the field of IP. Additional obstacles normally associated with working in LDCs (e.g. remote rural areas, digital gap, and brain drain) also are known to affect the efficiency of such IPRTA projects.
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Another important reason for the slow progress in the priority needs assessment process and in the provision of IPRTA is the abundance of actors within the LDCs. On the one hand, various government agencies are involved in or affected by the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement (the national IP offices, the ministries of industry, trade, finance, foreign affairs, justice, science and technology, culture, education, health, and agriculture, as well as enforcement agencies such as customs, police and courts). 46 On the other hand, a myriad of non-governmental stakeholders also have to be included in the decision-making process in order to effectively strengthen the national IP system (IP professionals, industry, inventors, collecting societies, academics, chambers of commerce, teachers, and the media as well as the public). The inclusion of such large and diverse groups inevitably affects the speed and efficiency of IPRTA projects.
As hinted at earlier, there is also a great need for internal national coordination on the donor side. The starting point is the inclusion of national IP offices. Many developed country Members, however, still have separate national offices for industrial property and copyrights, and these national IP offices normally have neither experts nor spending power when it comes to technical assistance activities. Thus, even the inclusion of national IP offices has proven to be more difficult than might be assumed. Moreover, as the TRIPS Agreement is only one part of a wider framework of trade relations, the national trade ministries as well as the trade diplomats negotiating in Geneva must also be included in the process. As the budgets for development cooperation are normally managed and controlled by national development cooperation agencies, these agencies must also play a role in the process. Furthermore, since the foreign affairs ministry is usually in charge of the official relationship with a potential beneficiary country (and likely have some representation in that country) it too should be included in the process. Again, with so many agencies and interests represented it has proven difficult to effectively coordinate IPRTA projects.
Further complicating the matter is that IP is extremely controversial in the development cooperation community and most representatives of development agencies have only a limited understanding of the underlying legal and socio-economic mechanisms. Put bluntly, there is widespread distrust among many of the above-mentioned stakeholders concerning the fundamental issue of whether increased IP protection is actually beneficial for LDCs or whether it simply takes away 'policy space' in a manner detrimental to meeting the needs and desires of LDCs. In light of this tension, development agencies often do not view the modernization of IP laws and institutions as a priority, given the many other competing interests of LDCs, thus making them reluctant to fund these sorts of initiatives and programmes.
Another set of problems can be attributed to the vagueness of the TRIPS Agreement provisions and the design of the priority needs assessment process. As stated above, the exact nature and scope of the obligation contained in Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement remain unclear.
Unanswered questions include whether the obligation merely requires a certain financial or technical input or whether it is an outcome-oriented obligation. In other words, it remains unclear whether a developed country Member is in compliance with its obligations under Article 67 when it provides a certain level of IPRTA or whether it is only in compliance when an LDC has finally managed to implement the TRIPS Agreement. This ambiguity also creates a certain liability problem for developed country Members; thus, by agreeing to provide technical and financial assistance, it is also unclear whether the developed countries have moved away from a position of merely demanding implementation of the TRIPS Agreement to a position where they have at least partly taken some responsibility for LDCs' implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.
As mentioned above, the quality and the scope of the priority needs assessments are very heterogeneous. Moreover, the implementation plans attached to some of the priority needs assessments do not follow standardized development cooperation procedures and principles which normally provide for the inclusion of the donors' capacities and preferences in the project design. As a result, it is highly unlikely that potential donors would support these implementation plans in an integral and comprehensive manner. Instead, a donor country will first have to assess the feasibility of a project and conduct its own project design to fulfil the requirements of its national development cooperation agency in terms of measurable outcomes, monitoring, accountability, ownership, and sustainability.
From a procedural point of view, it is unclear what the follow-up process to LDCs' priority needs assessments should be. The present situation creates uncertainty for all LDCs as it is not clear that investing already scarce resources into conducting an IP priority needs assessment will eventually result in the receipt of substantial technical and financial assistance in the identified priority areas. Some developed countries believe Members should respond to LDCs' requests on a first-come, first-served basis, others favour a case-by-case approach and some believe that a transparent and predictable process should be developed within the existing coordinating structures. It is also unclear how technical and financial assistance provided to LDCs under Article 67 could be coordinated with other existing mechanisms and initiatives in this area in a manner that is useful and avoids unnecessary duplication.
This paper argues that increased coordination at various levels, including within the donor countries and the beneficiary LDCs, as well as within the international development community would resolve some of the above-mentioned dilemmas. On the one hand, greater coordination in the funding of technical assistance could range from opening new funds and creating joint initiatives to the attempts to tap into existing funding mechanisms (e.g. funding through the EIF). On the other hand, cooperation is also essential in the actual provision of technical assistance. This could range from mere information exchange between the developed country Members about which donor is implementing a particular activity (checklist approach)
to outsourcing the implementation of entire projects to a central coordination body.
Again, the difficulty lies in actually creating a mechanism to increase coordination efforts.
Many developed country Members emphasize the need to identify a central coordination body -e.g. to set up a sort of 'clearing house' mechanism -while others would like WIPO and/or WTO to assume an essential role in this regard. Those favouring WTO involvement point to the WTO/WIPO Cooperation Agreement and the Joint Initiative as evidence of its interest in the subject matter. In contrast, several other developed country Members oppose WTO involvement for systemic reasons; they argue that the WTO should not assume the role of a development organization and that this type of activity could set a precedent for other trade sectors. As mentioned before, several developed country Members have identified the EIF as a possible channel of cooperation. In the following paragraphs we will further analyse this option.
5. The Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) and Aid-for-Trade (AfT) as potential coordinating bodies
In order for Members to agree on a coordinated, efficient and expeditious response to the priority needs identified by LDCs in their assessments, the role of existing multilateral mechanisms or frameworks that could come into play to address these needs merit further consideration.
In response to requests from a number of delegations, the WTO Secretariat compiled information on potential coordinating roles of the EIF and AfT in the needs assessment process for LDCs, with a particular focus on how the expertise and monetary resources of these two existing multilateral mechanisms could be made use of to assist LDCs in establishing their individual priority needs assessments and receiving IPRTA.
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The EIF is a multi-donor programme that strengthens cooperation among donors, six core Of course, using the EIF as a tool to fund IP-priorities identified in the priority needs assessment can only occur when an LDC identifies IP-related needs as a priority in its DTIS framework. In summary, using the EIF mechanism in the coordination of the priority needs 'shall not be required to apply the provisions of the Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, until 1 July 2021, or until such a date on which they cease to be a least developed country Member, whichever date is earlier'. Instead, it is proposed that what is needed is to increase the efficiency, transparency and predictability of the priority needs assessment process so that it creates enough incentives for both LDCs and developed countries to engage more effectively in integrating LDCs into the international IP system. As mentioned earlier, the submission of a priority needs assessment seems to be the crucial first step for LDCs and without it, no progress towards improved implementation of the TRIPS Agreement can be expected. 61 For discussion of some of the problems with the 'single undertaking' model, see Bryan Mercurio, 'The WTO and its Institutional Impediments', 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2007, p. 198-232 . In this section, the authors present three potential avenues to remedy some of the abovementioned disadvantages of the current situation after the Decision of June 2013:
-a reform of the priority needs assessment process;
-the need to identify additional incentives for LDCs and developed countries to cooperate more actively towards LDCs' integration in the global IP system; and -applying a more gradual and development-oriented concept of TRIPS-implementation for LDCs; and While admittedly none of these remedies provide the proverbial silver bullet we argue that they would all contribute to a more meaningful integration of LDCs.
2. The need to reform the priority needs assessment process
Most Members of the TRIPS Council seem to agree that the priority needs assessment process is an essential stocktaking exercise for all LDCs, not only in order to attract IPRTA but also simply as a developmental and governance exercise. Undertaking this process not only identifies the major shortcomings of an LDC's legal and institutional framework for the protection of IP, but it also has the potential to create political momentum for the LDC to actively engage in the multilateral system and improve its IP systems. Therefore, undertaking a priority needs assessment is viewed as having an essential role to play in encouraging LDCs to implement the TRIPS Agreement.
The TRIPS Council Decision of 2005 introduced the quasi-requirement for LDCs to submit their priority needs assessments 'preferably by 1 January 2008' and the requirement was virtually ignored by most LDCs. 63 The latest TRIPS Council Decision of 2013 does not contain any provision referring to these priority needs assessments. We therefore advocate that the WTO Members should revitalise the priority needs assessment process. Although it will not have an immediate impact on the 26 LDCs that have not yet submitted their priority needs assessments, it might be an important signal to set a new deadline for submission (as the completion of a priority needs assessment takes a considerable time, the deadline should be reasonable, e.g. at least two to three years). The conduction of a priority needs assessment should be more closely linked to the individual LDC's entitlement to request IPRTA under Article 67. This would ensure that as many LDCs as possible will undergo an internal stocktaking exercise within a reasonable period. Furthermore, it would also deprive some developed countries from making the well-worn argument that they cannot provide IPRTA as the LDC has not yet prioritized or even thoroughly internalized its IP management system.
However, the situation cannot be resolved simply through the introduction of a requirement for LDCs to submit a priority needs assessment. As mentioned above, at present the scope and quality of the priority needs assessment process are varied and results of priority needs assessments differ in their scope, depth, breadth and quality. Therefore, the WTO Members should also consider establishing minimal assessment standards and best-practice guidelines for the conduct and submission of priority needs assessments. The WTO Secretariat has already 63 See supra note 2, para.2.
commissioned a guidebook for LDCs on how to use technical and financial assistance for implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. 64 Such initiatives should be further strengthened.
Another issue to be addressed is the human capital and financial resources required to complete a priority needs assessment. It is clear that many LDCs would need considerable expert advice and financial support in order to undertake a priority needs assessment, provision of which the TRIPS Council should also discuss.
In addition to the requirement to undertake and submit a priority needs assessment, we also propose that LDCs should include the establishment of an adequate IP system within their national development plans (in particular within the DTIS of the EIF). While some commentators may view this requirement as unnecessarily intrusive or merely a tool for developed country monopolizers, we include this requirement for a practical reason. The reality of technical and financial cooperation is that international donors and development agencies now focus development aid only on certain areas that are also considered key priorities from a beneficiary country perspective. Failure to link the assistance requests contained in the priority needs assessment with national development plans will result in a significant decrease in the IPRTA available. In turn, this requirement is significant in the overall success or failure of the request. By contrast, aligning the requests contained in the priority needs assessment with the national development plans and strategies of the beneficiary country should strengthen the sustainability and ownership of cooperation projects and ensure the commitment and participation of all national stakeholders. Furthermore, as the establishment of IP laws and institutions requires a broad national consensus among various intergovernmental agencies and an abundance of other national stakeholders, it would seem that such an ambitious objective can only be achieved if it is backed by a national development plan.
3. Identifying additional incentives for LDCs and developed countries to engage and cooperate more actively
The low number of priority needs assessments is evidence that the current process neither offers sufficient carrots nor sticks to encourage LDCs' participation. On the one hand, the approaching deadlines of a transition period does not serve as a stick because it is obvious that most LDCs do not have the capacity to make any progress towards TRIPS-compliance and that 64 Pengelly, Tom and Jakob Engel (forthcoming), 'Using technical and financial assistance for implementation of the TRIPS Agreement: A guidebook for LDCs', forthcoming by the World Trade Organization, Geneva.
all of the LDCs simply expect a further extension, and probably another one after that. It is not even a stretch of the imagination to say that some, if not most, LDCs assume that they will never have to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. On the other hand, it is not easy to identify further incentives to encourage LDCs to participate in the TRIPS Agreement. This is particularly the case as the Agreement does not deal with trade concessions, but merely requires the implementation of minimum standards, procedural requirements and the like. One option for encouraging participation would be to further improve the conditions for technology transfer for those LDCs which actively participate in the priority needs assessment process. Another more feasible and easily operational incentive would be to reward the efforts of those eight LDCs that have already submitted priority needs assessments with swift and comprehensive IPRTA. This would provide others who may follow suit with the necessary certainty that they will also receive an appropriate level of support from developed country Members. As mentioned previously, the establishment of a coordination mechanism as well as the creation of a multilateral fund for IPRTA would play a crucial role in this process. In this regard, the efforts of the WTO Secretariat have thus far been important and should be continued. Therefore, we propose that the TRIPS Council should further strengthen the role of the WTO Secretariat in promoting the realization of Articles 66.1 and 67.
As mentioned in Section 3 of this paper, the provision of IPRTA is a relatively new phenomenon in the field of development cooperation, and the track record of IPRTA in LDCs is still extremely limited. Additional research on the impact of TRIPS in LDCs and the development of best practices in IPRTA is therefore crucial. Moreover, future research should also focus on collecting empirical data about the intellectual property systems of the world's poorest countries as well as adapting existing IP policies to serve the needs of LDCs.
4. Applying a more gradual and development-oriented concept of TRIPS-implementation for LDCs
Taking into account that most LDCs do not have the resources to implement the TRIPS Agreement in its entirety, and the legitimate question of whether this would even be useful or desirable given their limited innovative and administrative capacity, it is unrealistic to expect LDCs to establish a functioning fully-fledged IP system similar to the ones operating in developed or even middle-income developing countries. Therefore, it might be more practicable to apply a more gradual and development-oriented concept of TRIPSimplementation for LDCs. 65 Such an approach should focus first on reforms in those areas of IP that are essential for the LDCs' socio-economic development and that pave the way to a more stable, more innovative and more productive economy (e.g. establishing a basic but efficient system for the protection of national trademark holders). Setting a different standard is a transformation of the priority needs assessment to make the process more efficient, transparent and predictable so that it creates enough incentives for both LDCs and developed countries to engage more effectively in the integration of LDCs into the international IP system. Furthermore, we emphasize the need for improved coordination among all actors on the national, bilateral and multilateral level. As far as the funding of IPRTA is concerned the TRIPS Council has already identified the EIF as a potential channel of cooperation and will now require much effort as well as some additional fine-tuning to further promote this promising avenue. It is also crucial that the IP community engages in a constant dialogue with all the stakeholders involved to establish IPRTA as a credible tool for economic development cooperation.
The core of this paper is an analysis of the potential avenues for WTO Members after the second extension of the transition period in order to better integrate LDCs into the international IP system. In particular, we propose reform the priority needs assessment process, which make it more rewarding for all LDCs to undertake a priority needs assessment and to include the improvement of their IP system in their national development plans.
We also try to identify additional incentives for LDCs and developed countries to engage in improving the integration of LDCs into the global IP system (e.g. to look into improving conditions for technology transfer beyond the current Article 66.2 or to provide incentives for LDCs which comply in other sectors of trade). Finally, we advocate the application of a more gradual and development-oriented concept of TRIPS-implementation for LDCs and further recommend that the upcoming extension should be used to gradually introduce further core provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that would allow LDCs to integrate smoothly into the global IP system (e.g. by establishing a basic but efficient system for the protection of national trademark holders). We strongly believe that alternatives to simply offering further transition period extensions should be seriously discussed and adopted by the TRIPS Council in an effort to make the system more efficient, transparent and successful for all interested parties.
